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Abstract 
Although the legal and the political-scientific literatures on European competition 
policy (‘ECP’) are vast, there is no work that goes beyond the rationalization of stylized 
historical and/or legal facts. This approach may be justified on grounds of the political 
complexity of ECP and/or the heterogeneity of units of analysis. Nevertheless, the 
failure to come up with a positive device that identifies conditions under which specific 
policy decisions may or may not be possible has limited our assessments of the policy to 
value judgments rather than to true explanations. This paper attempts to remedy this 
situation by offering a logically complete and internally consistent model of ECP 
decision-making procedures. I show how the dependence of the European antitrust 
regulator (DG COMP) on a heterogeneous, multi-task and collegial organization (the 
Commission) severely constrains the feasible policy options of the former, and I argue 
that the nature and the goals of ECP are a function of (a) the ability of DG COMP to 
rely on national authorities, and (b) the distance between the ideal policy points of, on 
the one hand, the pivotal Directorate General in the Commission and, on the other hand, 
DG COMP and its internal opponents. Empirical work should follow.   
 
Keywords: European antitrust, market integration, Commission politics, DG COMP 
autonomy. 
 
 
  1Introduction  
 
Throughout the late 1960s and most of the 1970s, whisky producer Distillers was 
desperately attempting to break into continental markets. The whole plan of making a 
very British product as popular as wine or ouzo was far more difficult than it may sound 
today, as continental consumers turned out to be rather risk averse at the moment of 
admitting British superiority in foods and beverages. For that reason, Distillers’ 
continental distributors had to engage in expensive advertising and marketing 
campaigns, often without the certainty that such expenses would eventually pay off. 
Noting that these distributors would not exert all possible effort unless they received a 
credible commitment to the effect that their British counterparts would not free-ride on 
their investment, Distillers decided to charge the latter different prices for whisky aimed 
at home-based retailers and whisky aimed at export to the rest of the EEC.  
 
In 1978, the European Commission (hereafter, ‘Com’) decided to prohibit these 
agreements between Distillers and its UK distributors. The reasoning behind the Com’s 
decision was that quoting different prices for exports than for domestically-consumed 
goods amounted to unlawful territorial division of the Common Market. The prohibition 
thus strengthened the political and legal “common market integration dogma” (Van 
Bael 1980). By the same token, it downgraded the economic argument that the whole 
scheme was aimed at inciting Distillers’ sole distributors in other EEC countries to 
make efforts to promote whisky on Continental markets. It also ignored the view that, as 
long as Distillers’ products faced competition from other whisky manufacturers (or 
other spirits manufacturers), it did not matter how the company developed its 
commercial strategy. Further, the story did not simply end with the prohibition of 
Distillers’ agreements, nor with the ECJ’s endorsement of it. Quite expectedly, the 
European authorities’ decision led Distillers to (a) completely separate its British and its 
Continental operations, (b) sell altogether different brands in each market, and (c) 
charge considerably higher prices in the UK, for over a decade. Hence, what was 
intended as a market integration-preserving decision ended up producing the exact 
opposite effect.
1  
                                                 
1 For a full account of the Distillers’ case, see the subsequent decision of the European Court of Justice 
(hereafter, ‘ECJ’), Case 30/78, Distillers v. Commission. See also Korah 1978. 
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At roughly the same time as the Com and ECJ were struggling to ignore such basic 
economic concepts as (a) the distinction between inter-brand and intra-brand 
competition, and (b) the role of the elasticity of demand and supply in the definition of 
the relevant product market, the U.S. authorities were moving towards ever-greater 
economic sophistication. Under the leadership of the Nixon appointees in the Supreme 
Court, antitrust policy entered a period of radical policy change. It moved away from 
the “progressive” antitrust policy of the Warren Court, the Celler and Kefauver 
committees, and the Federal Trade Commission (‘FTC’) and the Department of Justice 
(‘DoJ’), and closer to the laissez-faire principles of the Chicago School of economics 
and antitrust thought. The case that has come to symbolize the victory Chicago over 
structuralism was ‘Sylvania’.
2  
 
Sylvania (1977) shared four important characteristics with Distillers (1978). First, this 
too was a case about the prohibition of territorial restrictions in distribution agreements. 
Second, this too was a case decided by a federal authority whose mandate consisted in 
preserving competition in inter-state trade. Third, this too was a case conditioned by 
important and well-established case law that pointed to a dogma-like prohibition.
3 And 
finally, here too the defendant made an economic argument, claiming that certain types 
of vertical agreement foster inter-brand competition and enhance consumer welfare, and 
should therefore not be prohibited per se. Yet, the outcome was very different from 
Distillers: the Supreme Court privileged economics over law, and consumer welfare 
over other possible policy goals despite the case, and thus ruled in favour of a rule of 
reason (i.e. an analysis of the case on its merits).  
 
Significantly, the U.S. Supreme Court was not the only influential antitrust policy-
maker that made substantial inroads into economics in the late 1970s and early 80s. In 
the U.S., the FTC and the DoJ soon followed suit (Kovacic and Shapiro 2000). In 
Europe, the German authorities – also in charge of a federal market – were eventually 
                                                 
2 Continental T.V., Inc. et al. v. GTE Sylvania Inc. 433 U.S. 36.  
3 United States v. Arnold, Schwinn et Co., 388 U.S. 365. In the EEC, the relevant precedent was Case 56 
and 58-64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-GmbH v. Commission of the European 
Economic Community. According to two of the leading legal scholars in EEC antitrust, “Grundig stands 
for a virtual per se prohibition of what in EEC antitrust parlance is known as absolute territorial 
protection” (Van Bael 1980: 45), and “the Commission has evolved a per se-type approach toward some 
of the hard-core restraints, just as the United States courts have done.” (Hawk 1979: 502)   
 
  3forced to refine their ordo-liberal position and to move towards a refined concept of 
workable competition (Kantzenbach 1990, Dumez and Jeunemaître 1991: 119). Even in 
France, a centralised and traditionally non-liberal political economy, the government 
headed by Raymond Barre passed Law 77-806 of July 19, 1977, which was heavily 
informed by research in industrial organization economics, and which privileged 
universalistic goals such as consumer welfare rather than particularistic claims (Jenny 
1990: 150-51).
4
 
On the one hand, we have the Com and the ECJ sticking to the same one goal of market 
integration (at the expense of consumer welfare) to the point of making it self-defeating. 
On the other hand, we have a series of very different competition decision-makers who 
nevertheless flexibly adapt their policy goals to new economic learning and to changing 
political and economic conditions. This difference is somewhat surprising, as it 
contradicts the standard view that the Com is a technocratic powerhouse which receives 
delegated powers in order to promote knowledgeable in a politically efficient way (e.g. 
Haas 1964, Lindberg 1963, Pollack 2003).
5 With this article I seek to further this debate 
and to shed some light on the decision-making calculus of the Com in antitrust policy. I 
address three questions: (1) What explains the observed variation in the policy goals of 
the Com as opposed to those of other leading antitrust authorities? (2) Why was to Com 
so dogmatic about market integration for so long? And (3) what made it evolve away 
from that dogma from the late 1990s onwards? In short, I seek to build a theory of 
European antitrust policy-making.  
 
I show that, while the Com may under certain circumstances develop a coherent 
antitrust policy, that policy will be fundamentally shaped by an institutional factor that 
                                                 
4 For a more sceptical view regarding the extent to which economics motivated the 1977 law, see Dumez 
and Jeunemaître 1991: 77-79.   
5 Franchino claims the opposite, i.e. that the Commission lacks a “marked professional specialization”, 
that “delegation to national administrations is guided by the fact that they have far greater resources and 
technical expertise than the Commission”, and that “national expertise is more valuable to the legislators 
than supranational generalist skills” (Franchino 2007: 143-44). Thus, “the limited technical expertise of 
supranational bureaucrats, compared to that of national officials, advises against extensive reliance on the 
Commission in highly complex and technical policy areas.” (op. cit. 293) Interestingly, he also claims – 
but offers not evidence to that effect – that “competition rules (both general and specific to the transport 
sector) … are relatively simple measures” (op cit. 165-66) while, for example, consumer protection or the 
regulation of the professions are not. Second, Franchino assumes that the Commission may impose 
agency losses to the national governments, but that national administrations cannot (because they are 
perfect agents of their political masters). I suspect that most competition policy specialists hold a different 
view on both issues (see Amato 1997, Vickers 2001).       
  4has been largely ignored in the literature, namely the multi-task and collegial character 
of the Com. Multi-task collegiality means that, unlike its counterparts in the U.S., 
Germany, or France, Europe’s antitrust regulator (DG COMP) is nested in a much 
broader organisation (the Com), all of whose members have an equal saying in antitrust 
matters. If, as I suggest, this creates an important constraint on DG COMP policy 
options, then cases such as Distillers may be interpreted as an attempt by DG COMP to 
signal its commitment to cooperation with other DGs. Indeed, under certain 
circumstances, such “absurd” policies are a second-best solution, falling short only of 
complete DG COMP autonomy through the creation of a true European Cartel Office. 
The theory predicts that the goals of European antitrust depend on two factors: (1) the 
relative distance between the ideal policy points of the pivotal DG and those of the 
competing alternatives, and (2) the possibility for DG COMP to rely not on Com 
decisions, but on national authorities.    
    
To explore this assertion, I first return to the research question and I review the main 
arguments in the existing literature regarding European competition policy-making, its 
structure and its goals. The next section describes a redistribution model of Com 
decision-making in competition policy, where DGs with mixed motives battle over the 
reach of their respective policies. It is followed, in the conclusion, by a short plausibility 
probe which, although falling well short of an empirical test, lends support to the main 
insights gained from the theoretical model. In addition, the conclusion discusses certain 
weak links in the theoretical model as well as possible empirical implications.     
 
The choice of antitrust goals: existing explanations  
 
How is European antitrust policy decided, and what are the consequences of that 
process in terms of the policy’s goals and of its economic sophistication? What 
determines the smooth operation of the policy, and what triggers turf wars among the 
most relevant political actors, and what are the preferences of these actors? Finally, 
under what conditions can we expect the European Union to have a world-class 
competition policy and to avoid fiascos such as Distillers?  
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political-scientific understanding of European antitrust politics (and EU politics in 
general), thereby enhancing our ability to give sound advise to interested actors. 
Second, it will throw light on several important and long-standing legal debates, such as 
the issue of the participation (and the specific role) of national competition authorities in 
EU policy. Third, and more importantly, such understanding is needed for actual policy 
purposes. What is at stake here may be nothing less than the way Europe builds 
institutions that define its political economy through the regulation of private and public 
market power.  
 
Options for antitrust policy 
 
It must be stressed that an economy-wide (as opposed to sectoral) regulatory policy 
such as antitrust can serve a number of purposes, many of which have been forcefully 
proposed in the course of European integration. According to Barry Hawk, for example, 
a non-exhaustive list of potential policy goals for includes, “1. Consumer 
welfare/allocative efficiency in the static sense; 2. Production efficiency in the static 
sense; 3. Efficiency in dynamic sense (e.g. innovation, etc); 4. Income distribution or 
wealth transfer effects; 5. Deconcentration/dispersal of economic power and 
preservation of democratic government; 6. Protection of small and medium sized 
enterprises; 7. Protection of individual traders/entrepreneurs; 8. Employment effects; 9. 
Market integration; 10. Environmental, health and safety, and other considerations; 11. 
“Industrial policy”; 12. “Competitiveness”; 13. Promotion of national champions; 14. 
Promotion of exports and international trading conditions; 15. Fairness/equity; 16. 
Promotion of opportunity; 17. Protection of consumers from exploitation; 18. “Public 
interest”; 19. Macroeconomic effects (e.g. combat inflation); 20. Others.” (Hawk 1998: 
351-52) 
6
                                                 
6 Of course, most antitrust specialists in 2009 would agree that some of these goals are not suitable for 
antitrust policies. In addition, certain items in the list seem very similar or overlapping (e.g. “protection 
of individual traders” and “promotion of opportunity”, or “protection of SMEs” and “income distribution 
and wealth transfer effects”). Furthermore, lists like this one are not underpinned by a systematic theory 
of political action and/or public policy. [For example, “wealth transfers”, a standard component of all 
political action in the economic realm, is not a goal that can be compared to, say, “production efficiency”. 
While the former is the motivation for competition policy, the latter is a possibility that opens up only 
once the first issue has been decided (or at least provisionally accepted as a basis on which additional 
details may be built).] On the other hand, if leading specialists list these goals as different, this may mean 
that lawyers perceive them as such. And indeed, it seems reasonable to distinguish between even closely 
  6   
This list serves to highlight the vast number of permutations in which these goals can be 
chosen, and by implication the curious option taken by the Com to always privilege 
market integration for over three decades. Mathematically, the formula for the ways 
these goals can be combined is  Cn,r = n! / (n-r)!r!   if the order of goals does not matter, 
or Pn,r = n! / (n-r)!  if the order matters, where “n” is the total number of possible goals, 
and “r” is the number of goals chosen for implementation. Allowing for the selection of 
5 out of 19 possible goals, the formulae yield 11,628 combinations and 
1,395,360  permutations.  Even assuming that wealth transfer effects  is a goal that is 
relevant  to each and every  public policy action,  the other 18 goal still yield  612 
combinations and 73,440 permutations. Finally, given that a policy that aims at goals 
15, 16, 17, 18, and 19 (in that order) surely differs from one that aims at 19, 18, 17, 16, 
and 15 (in that order), we should be counting permutations, not combinations. This 
means that if a new antitrust authority can (or must) choose 5 among 18 possible goals, 
it will face an amazing choice between 73,440 possible  policies. Consequently, an 
important question concerns the determinants of that choice: what makes the antitrust 
authority pick its goals in some way and not in another? And, why did DG COMP 
systematically choose to rank market integration first, when it had so many other 
alternatives?   
 
Existing explanations of the Com’s policy choices 
 
To find how and why the Com orders its goals, a large empirical literature has 
developed since the early 1990s. Various political scientists and legal scholars have 
analysed policy choices, making one (or more) of the four following arguments:  
 
(1) Policy goals are set by legal and/or political contracts. Bureaucrats receive a 
mandate from their political principals; upon accepting it, they are liable for their 
actions before the ECJ; hence, as long as the latter does not collude with them, 
                                                                                                                                               
related goals. For example, while employment effects are similar to macroeconomic effects, their 
relevance may be purely regional (as opposed to national), and their taking on board may lead to different 
policy outcomes than inflation-related concerns. It is therefore  possible to argue that, despite their 
similarities, these goals are not identical. The upshot is that a competition authority  faces a choice 
between any two or more of them (i.e. for two goals it may either adopt the first and not the second, or 
adopt the second and not the first, or adopt both, or reject both, etc).    
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principals. On the legal side of the literature, Valentine Korah (1982), a leading 
European antitrust lawyer, offers a typical example of this approach. Although she 
acknowledges that “the Treaty of Rome contains many provisions which require 
subordinate legislation” (1982: 196), she argues that “the  introductory principles [set 
out in Article 2 and in the Preamble to the Treaty] are vital in the construction and 
application of Community law. The more specific provisions of the treaty are construed 
in the light of the objectives of the Community…” (op. cit. at 193). Gerber (1998), a 
legal historian, makes a less constitutional claim, and argues that DG COMP received 
its mandate from the German government, and in particular from the ordo-liberal 
faction therein (see also Moravcsik 1998). On the political-scientific side, Wilks and 
McGowan argue that “European competition policy could be expected to be serving the 
interests of some coalition of member states, and, indeed, suggestions about an Anglo-
German alliance have plausibility” (1996: 226). Pollack (2003) offers another good 
political-scientific example of the same approach, although he acknowledges both that 
principals do communicate with their agents, and that the agents can benefit from 
incomplete contracts and an imperfect judiciary (in contradiction to the basic 
assumptions of principal-agent theory). 
 
(2) Policy goals depend on ideational (i.e. epistemic or ideological) factors. Bureaucrats 
are expert professionals who may have a mandate, but who are also in search for the 
best policy; they belong to a vaster epistemic community, from which they gain 
inspiration and specific policy ideas. On the legal side of the literature, Joerges (2006) 
argues that European antitrust has traditionally constituted a substantial part of the 
European Economic Constitution, that this was achieved through the influence of 
mainly German ordo-liberal ideas, and that new economics-based concepts of antitrust 
are now winning over. (See also Hildebrand 2002: 160-61 and Gerber 1998.) On the 
political-scientific side, Wilks and McGowan claim that “in the field of competition 
policy a policy network is apparent among inter-governmental actors” (1996: 241). 
They add that, although “it is far less easy to identify a policy network that stretches 
outside government”, “the great exception to this argument is the lawyers. The 
dominance of lawyers over European competition policy is remarkable... It produces 
some very distinctive policy dynamics.” (op. cit. 242-44) Finally, a related argument is 
often made regarding the influence of macro-ideological factors, such as the dominance 
  8of Keynesianism in the 1960s and 70s, or the neo-liberal turn in the 1980s (op. cit. 245; 
see also Cini and McGowan 1998: 16). 
 
(3) Policy goals depend on individual leadership. Much of the political-scientific 
literature cites the talents of individual commissioners as a crucial explanatory factor in 
the waxing and waning of European antitrust. For example, Wilks and McGowan 
attribute significant policy changes in the 1980s to “political leadership. The 
significance of leadership from the Commissioner was established by Peter Sutherland, 
whose success was built upon by Leon Brittan. [Sutherland] was a dynamic, charismatic 
character portrayed as a young, tough Irishman, who combined the legal flair of the 
barrister with the aggression of the rugby captain. … Living up to the reputation he 
acquired at the DTI, Brittan proved to be a sophisticated operator on the Brussels scene. 
Although notorious for intellectual arrogance, he became a decisive and determined 
administrator able to inspire loyalty, to impose priorities, and to provide strategic 
leadership.” (Wilks and McGowan 1996: 246; see also McGowan and Wilks 1995, and 
Cini and McGowan 1998: 38)            
 
(4) Policy goals depend on the goals of runaway bureaucrats. A political-scientific spin-
off of the economic theory of principal-agent holds that contracts may be incomplete, 
and that the agents may end up imposing unforeseen (and therefore non-factored for) 
agency losses on principals. Accordingly, many scholars argue that European antitrust is 
now beyond the control of nationally elected politicians, that it is discretionarily 
managed by an autonomous group of EU-level bureaucrats (DG COMP), and that the 
policy serves whatever goals these bureaucrats may privilege. European antitrust is thus 
seen as “the first supranational policy” (McGowan and Wilks 1995: 141), governed by a 
“federal agency” (Wilks and McGowan 1996: 225), which, by and large, acts 
independently from the legislative and executive branches of government, according to 
its “self-defined mission” (Wilks and McGowan 1996: 246. See also Budzinski and 
Christiansen 2005, McGowan 2000, McGowan and Cini 1999, Wilks and Bartle 2002).       
  
What emerges from that literature review is that (a) DG COMP is thought to enjoy 
considerable autonomy from national governments, and (b) DG COMP sets policy 
according to its own epistemic considerations, subject to the constraints imposed on it 
by the Treaty (or the ECJ). From an analytical perspective, it is interesting to note that 
  9the literature does not draw a clear distinction between the Com (i.e. the whole multi-
task collegial organization) and DG COMP (i.e. a small part of the Com), and the two 
terms are often used inter-changeably. Even those authors who do note the potential for 
conflict between DGs do not derive any hypothesis regarding the effect that such 
conflict may have on European antitrust policy.
7 Of course, that it has been instructive 
to view the Com as a unitary actor for some purposes is evident from the numerous 
insights that this literature has generated. Thus, the point here is not that the unitary 
actor assumption for the Com is by definition useless for all research purposes; rather, it 
is that such an assumption impedes progress in the more specific policy-oriented 
literature. To regard the Com as a unitary actor, or to talk about “Commission 
preferences” misses much of what is truly distinctive about European antitrust politics. 
That difference is shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
 
FIGURE 1: The politics of EU antitrust, with and without a unitary actor 
assumption for the Commission 
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Policy Outcomes  Inter-Branch Politics   Com Preference 
NB. In most models the policy space is one-dimensional “Com preference” is usually imputed to be 
“more federalism”  
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Policy Outcomes 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 The explanation for this may be that the vast majority of political scientists who write on European 
antitrust take a distinctively legal, as opposed to political-scientific (i.e. social choice-theoretic and/or 
game-theoretic) perspective. Yet what may be reasonable for lawyers may be misleading for political 
scientists. As I will show below, the fact that the ECJ forbears before matters of internal organization may 
be enough to support legal scholars’ neglect of the presence of different DGs with potentially conflicting 
preferences, but it is not enough to warrant a similar approach in political science.      
  10Quite beyond the question of actorness, in my view all existing arguments suffer from 
one or more of the following problems: 
 
1)  The attribution of variable outcomes to a constant cause. This is most evident in the 
case of legal and liberal intergovernmental arguments about the constraining effect 
of the Treaty on specific policy goals (especially market integration). While the 
relevant parts of the Treaty (the preamble and Articles 2 and 3) have not changed in 
any significant way since the 1950s, the goals of antitrust policy have. It follows 
that either the presumed cause is not really one, or that the mechanism that leads 
from cause to effect is under-specified.  
2)  Historiographical mistakes such as anachronisms and excessive discounting of more 
remote events. This is most evident in the case of arguments regarding the 
ineffectiveness and the poor staffing of DG COMP in he 1960s and 70s, or the 
exceptional talents of commissioners Sutherland and Brittan. True as it may be that 
the number of decisions grew steadily after 1985, it must also be recognised that 
ground-breaking decisions such as Consten and Grundig (1966), Continental Can 
(1971)
8, and Hoffmann LaRoche (1976)
9 were made long before that. Similarly, 
although recent commissioners have indeed proved to be men and women of 
substance, it does not follow that such intellectual and political leaders as Hans von 
der Groeben were not.  
3)  Excessive focus on the nominal decision-making unit. This is most evident in those 
works which take a public administration perspective, distinguish between core 
from non-core actors on the basis of impression, and concentrate on the immediate 
decision-making unit. This procedure leads to excessive emphasis on causes internal 
to the core actor, who seems to be the only one active in policy-making; by the same 
token it neglects contextual conditions and constraints, and it does not allow for an 
exploration of the interdependent strategising which so often characterises politics.   
4)  A-theoretical empiricism. Most importantly, the vast majority of the legal and 
political-scientific works on European antitrust do not work up from clear 
assumptions to the logically complete derivation of testable hypotheses. Rather,     
they amount, at best, to a rationalization of stylized historical facts. We therefore 
                                                 
8  On the importante of this case, see Goyder 2003: 336-37.  
9 Goyder 2003: 268, 291. 
  11lack a positive device that identifies conditions conducive to particular policy 
options.  
 
A model of European antitrust policy-making 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the discipline of European politics is still in need 
of an analytical model which, departing from simple assumptions about the nature, the 
preferences, and the strategies of the relevant actors, spells out the different institutional 
and political conditions that lead to different antitrust policies. This section attempts to 
remedy that situation by presenting a formal theory of the choice of European 
competition policy. The model is based on a game played to determine the internal 
redistribution over the Com’s collective authority and resources. As it turns out, the 
multi-task and collegial character of the Com renders European antitrust policy-making 
very similar to other redistributive politics (see generally Persson and Tabellini 2000, 
Boix 2003). Thus, whether DG COMP succeeds in passing its preferred decisions 
depends on (1) the relative distance between its preferred option and that of the pivotal 
DG in the Com, and (2) its ability to redeploy its resources to policy-making activities 
that are not subject to Com voting. 
 
Assumptions      
 
Before I provide details of the model, it is necessary to clarify four simple, plausible, 
and important assumptions. First and foremost, the model is based on a view of the Com 
not as a unitary actor which can be assumed to have some set of preferences in any 
meaningful way, but as a collective actor whose internal politics are equally important 
to policy outcomes as its external environment. Thus, I explicitly depart from views 
such as that “the Council established DG Comp’s legal competence to operate as an 
autonomous and quasi-judicial policy-making institution under Regulation 17/62” 
(McGowan 2005: 989). Rather, I base my concept of the Com on the following quote:   
 
“… the Commission is not a monolithic or even a unitary body. It is made up of 
directorates-general … each of which is responsible for a particular functional or 
sectoral policy and each of which is motivated by different goals and value systems. 
The potential for conflict is, therefore, immense. This can make decision-making 
  12within  the Commission a sensitive and highly political business, for in the 
Commission we can often see a microcosm of the European Union as a whole … 
The potential for disputes within the College and amongst Commissioners is 
great…” (Cini and McGowan 1998: 43; see also Cini 1996: 458, and Korah 1994: 
17) 
 
Consequently, for the purposes of the model, the Com is constituted by a number of 
pro-antitrust, a number of anti-antitrust, and a number of antitrust-neutral DGs, where 
preferences come from portfolios (mandates). The first category of DGs (the more 
“liberal”) can be represented as L; the second (the “non-liberal”) as N. In any one 
decision-making event DG COMP and perhaps DG MARKT may belong to L; DG 
IND, DG REGIO, and DG INFSO may belong to N. Historically, N have been a natural 
majority with a share α > ½ of the vote in the college, and L a minority with a share 1 – 
α of the vote in the college. On the other hand, L have enjoyed a better initial 
distribution of legal and political authority, and professional and logistic resources. 
Battles between the two factions may be decided by an explicit vote, and the pivotal DG 
can be represented as P. Related to this assumption about politics being played between 
DGs, I also assume there is no relevant politics below the level of the DG: neither 
directorates nor individual bureaucrats have intrinsic motivations because their contracts 
create incentives that make them accountable to their hierarchy.   
 
Second, policy conflict revolves around two main issues: first, the autonomy of the 
expert DG in deciding matters that fall under its delegated jurisdiction; and second, the 
professional, logistic, and temporal resources at the disposal of the expert DG. Both of 
these issues are important, since the former (i.e. turf wars) relates to policy content, 
including policy goals, while the latter (i.e. resource-related wars) relates to the quantity 
of decisions produced. In order to capture the dual nature of the conflict, it is convenient 
to describe turf (‘t’) and resources (‘r’) as a single quantity, policy stock (‘Π’). 
Consequently, Π =  t + r . Further, N, who are the majority, hold together a total policy 
stock ΠN. The other faction, L, who are the minority, hold ΠL. The Com-wide stock of 
policy is  ΠN  + ΠL = Π and the battle concerns the relative size of the two terms. One 
very important managerial and political implication is that DGs will do everything they 
can to (a) protect their Π, and (b) avoid spending resources and gaining expertise on the 
preparation of policy decisions and/or proposals that will later be outvoted by the 
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has achieved its policy preferences and career concern objectives. Formally, Πj = yj , j = 
N, L. 
 
Third, I assume that the DGs which constitute the Com have preferences that can be 
described as points on a Cartesian plane, and not just on a one-dimensional continuum 
described by Π. Although the horizontal axis measures their preferences on a specific 
policy dimension – in competition policy, values range from public market power to 
strong competition policy to private market power – this does not exhaust the 
dimensionality of intra-Com antitrust politics. Rather, the vertical axis measures 
preferences on the integration dimension, ranging from extremely nationalistic to 
extremely integrationist. (See Figure 2 below.) DGs may have diametrically opposed 
preferences (mandates) on the horizontal axis. At the same time, however, all of them 
belong to an organization that benefits from ever more integration and from keeping 
united against other branches of government and/or public opinion. Thus, they all 
acknowledge the importance of the vertical axis, both in general ideological terms and 
in terms of preserving the Com’s constitutional prerogatives. The appropriate metaphor, 
then, is that they all argue about their respective slice of the pie, while acknowledging 
their common interest in enlarging the pie. In the language of game theory, DGs play a 
game with mixed motives.   
 
The important points behind these first three assumptions are two: (1) DGs  are engaged 
in a perennial game with mixed motives: while they recognize that it is in their common 
interest to reach consensual agreements and to protect the unity of their umbrella 
organization, they are also motivated by heterogeneous, often outright conflicting   
policy goals. And (2) these conflicts translate into tensions over the distribution of the 
Com’s total authority and resources (it “policy stock”). DGs that receive delegated 
powers to manage a policy can be thought of as starting off with limited policy stocks. 
Each one then invests its limited resources in augmenting its own stock. Because Com 
policies can afford to be only so much inconsistent, and only in the short run (in the 
medium and long run the Council of Ministers and/or the ECJ will intervene to correct 
anomalies that produce excessively uncertain legal effects), such investments eventually 
lead to internal frictions. When that happens, each DG fights for a favourable 
redistribution (i.e. expropriation) of as much policy stock of other DGs as possible. This 
  14is most obvious in the example of a DG’s (or an individual bureaucrat’s) fear of being 
denied the returns on its investment – e.g. of DG COMP being denied a decision on a 
complex case on IT systems by a negative pivotal vote by the commissioner responsible 
for fisheries. But it is vital for a correct understanding of the model to appreciate that 
the fight over limited policy stocks may be triggered by “aggressive” moves, too, such 
as in the example of DG INDUSTRY trying to get DG COMP to draft an exemption 
decision for a crisis cartel in the steel industry.  
 
Figure 2 below tries to illustrate both this situation and, anticipating the argument that 
follows, the pressure that it puts on DG COMP (L1) to co-opt P by emphasizing its 
commitment to the common goal of market integration. The final Com decision depends 
on the distance between the ideal point of, on the one hand, P and, on the other hand, 
each of the two contending policy proposals, N and L. Where decision-making involves 
only the horizontal dimension, L is farther from P than N, and so the latter is adopted. 
But if L manages to make decision-makers concerned with the vertical dimension, too, 
and is willing to engage in costly signalling with respect to that dimension, then it 
positions itself closer to P than N is, and so P votes L.    
 
FIGURE 2: Intra-Com politics between L and N: From one to two dimensions.  
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  15Finally, policy decisions relate to a bureaucracy’s limited resources and to individual 
bureaucrats’ career concerns in a way that makes them somewhat specific to the 
bureaucratic unit that makes the decision. For example, interventionist antitrust 
decisions to regulate markets in Europe can be made either by DG COMP or, with 
certain restrictions, by national competition authorities (hereafter, NCAs). Whenever 
something like this happens, such decisions lose a share σ of their value for DG COMP. 
That is because sponsoring, training, convincing, advising, and monitoring the NCAs 
are all costly to DG COMP’s limited resources and/or because a decision by an NCA 
does not satisfy the career concerns of European bureaucrats. More exactly, policy stock 
Π, which produces y = Π whenever decisions are made by DG COMP, produces y
a = 
Π(1 – σ)  when decisions are left to other bureaucracies, such as the NCAs. The variable 
σ can take values from 0 to 1. Increasing values indicate that the option of delegating 
powers to other bureaucracies becomes less attractive, and vice versa.      
 
Taxes on Π, internal politics, and external alliances 
 
Com politics can take place either in isolation from external actors or with the 
involvement of such actors. In the former case, DGs either know the distribution of their 
preferences and accept the resulting distribution of Π, or they proceed to explicit votes, 
whereby the distribution of Π is decided by P on a case-by-case basis. Changes in the 
status quo distribution of Π are thus equivalent to a tax on DGs’ authority and 
resources: the majority (including P) draws from the resources of the minority. On the 
other hand, Com politics may involve the intervention of powerful outsiders. That may 
occur when either L or N do not acknowledge the commonality of interests between 
Com factions (i.e. they attempt to ignore the vertical axis in Figure 2), and so one or 
more DGs seek to forge an alliance with one or more national governments. For 
example, if DG COMP finds the erosion of the status quo policy, authority, and 
resources (ΠL) unacceptable, it may forge (at some cost) an alliance with similarly-
minded governments (say, the governments of Germany, the Netherlands, and the UK). 
The purpose of such an alliance will be to outvote ΠN  policy proposals in the Council 
and/or the Parliament. Finally, there is a third case, which may follow up from the 
involvement of outsiders: both factions seek external support, and an EU-wide crisis 
begins. However, its effectiveness, and hence the final outcome of the conflict between 
L and N, is uncertain.  
  16 
Assume as a baseline model that the first case obtains, and that Com politics remains 
intra-organizational. Each DG produces its own policy, and at some point frictions 
occur. Such frictions are resolved by a redistribution of Π according to the preferences 
of the pivotal DG, P. Since, by definition, P belongs to N, it will set a redistribution tax 
(which can be represented by ΔΠ) such as to maximize ΠN . Taking into account that 
this procedure generates some welfare losses which, for simplicity, can be represented 
by the quadratic function  (ΔΠ)
2 / 2 , this means that P seeks to maximize the following 
function for ΔΠ ranging from 0 to ΠL : 
maxΔΠ (1 – ΔΠ) ΠN + ΔΠ – [(ΔΠ)
2 / 2]                                (1)
10
 
In maximizing net transfers, the pivotal DG will be subject to members of L choosing 
not to defer production or even to delegate policy decisions to other actors. For 
example, if DG SANCO is P, it will try to bite into DG COMP’s policy stock subject to 
DG COMP moving relevant antitrust decisions in the area of health to NCAs. This 
constraint can be expressed as follows:  
(1 – ΔΠ) ΠL ≥ (1 – σ) ΠL       ( 2 )
11
 
Solving this optimization problem, the redistributed (i.e. expropriated) policy stock will 
be: 
 ΔΠ = min {1 – ΠN , σ} where    ΠN = ΠP    (3)    
 
Hence, P will choose a level of redistribution equal to the smaller of two parameters: the 
level of specificity of the policy stock (σ), and the difference between the status quo 
distribution of authority and resources and the policy stock owned by P, who, as 
mentioned above, has historically belonged to N. The policy stock of each DG that 
results from this maximization can be denoted by y’j . The interpretation of this result is 
straightforward: Where σ is high, approaching a maximum of 1, L lose a lot by 
                                                 
10 The intuition behind this formula is simple: the pivotal DG of the Com attempts to maximize the 
amount of resources and authority that serve its own policy preferences. It therefore maximizes its own 
policy stock (the first term), minimizes DG COMP’s policy stock (the second term), and tries to save on 
transaction and other procedural costs (the third term).   
11 Again, the intuition is simple: the Com pivotal DG faces a participation constraint: it can expropriate 
DG COMP only to the point where the latter starts preferring incurring the costs associated with 
delegating the decision to NCAs. The left hand-side of the inequality expresses the benefits to DG COMP 
after redistribution. The right hand-side expresses the benefits to DG COMP after delegation of powers to 
NCAs.   
  17delegating powers to NCAs. Accordingly, they cannot credibly threat to bypass the 
Com, and so the level of ΔΠ is not constrained by delegation. In such a case, the optimal 
level of ΔΠ for the pivotal DG is determined simply by the relative size of ΠN and ΠP .  
Geometrically, this means that the greater the distance between P and N, the higher the 
expropriation imposed by the former on the L will be.  
 
When the costs of delegating antitrust powers to NCAs decrease, and σ approaches 0, 
the expropriation of DG COMP becomes constrained by the possibility that L will 
sincerely attempt to bypass the Com. Even if preferences are scattered very wide apart, 
and the pressure to impose a high ΔΠ is strong, neither N as a whole nor P as a 
moderate member of N can redistribute the policy stock of DG COMP because, under 
those circumstances, European antitrust would just be implemented by NCAs. In short, 
the ability to bypass the Com and to rely on NCAs, like low heterogeneity of policy 
preferences, results in low redistribution of authority and resources.    
 
Let us now turn to the second type of Com politics, where one faction appeals to an 
external ally, thereby threatening Com unity. Since we have been most interested in the 
case where DG COMP is attacked by expropriation-minded opponents of a strong 
antitrust policy, let us explore the possibility that DG COMP (or more generally L) 
reacts to such a threat by forging an alliance with a necessary number of national 
governments, but not without noting that such an alliance may just as well be offensive 
rather than defensive (see Figure 3 below). As mentioned above, the goal here is to 
protect antitrust by establishing issue-linkages, whereby DG COMP’s allies threaten N 
on their own policy grounds. Since most DGs that belong to N are not in charge of a 
policy as supranational as antitrust, the threat may be credible. The creation of such an 
alliance is, however, costly, both in terms of he policy concessions that L must make to 
their allies and in terms of the lost unity of the Com. These costs can be represented as 
ρ. Given that the alliance manages to set ΔΠ = 0, L’s benefits can be denoted ΠL – ρ. Of 
course, ρ is a variable that can take on different values; low values mean that L can 
successfully resist N’s attack, and vice versa.    
 
Finally, there exists the possibility that both factions turn to powerful outside allies, and 
that an EU-wide crisis occurs, thereby annihilating Com unity and the medium run 
prospect of an increased Π. In other words, the blocking of redistributive claims by the 
  18L-led alliance may not be left uncontested. On the contrary, N may find their own 
supporters among powerful national governments, perhaps in Italy, Spain, and France. 
As already mentioned, the outcome of the ensuing crisis will be a function of the 
resources of the two factions, which is equivalent to saying that it will depend on the 
alliance costs borne by L, i.e. ρ. If that is low, L will eventually succeed in fending off 
the attack and will attempt to enlarge ΠL. If the cost they incur during a crisis in which 
they are successful is ω, then their final gain will be yL
crisis = ΠL – ω. In turn, N will lose 
a part ξ of their policy stock, ending up with yN =  ΠN – ξ – ρ. Finally, if N emerge 
victorious from the crisis, they impose a high ΔΠ on that part of L’s policy stock that 
cannot be delegated to NCAs. Hence, they end up with a payoff yN
crisis = ΠN + σΠL – ω.  
 
From types of politics to types of policies 
 
Having identified the main actors of the model and their payoffs under different 
assumptions about (a) DG preferences, (b) the possibility of delegating policy authority 
to NCAs, and ultimately, (c) the type of Com politics, it is now possible to explore the 
conditions that determine the selection of the type of politics, and hence the probability 
of different policies. Remember that the goal is to explore the conditions under which 
DG COMP will play a strategy of cooperation with other DGs, and when it will not. 
 
Following Boix (2003) again, we may ask why the factions would ever adopt the third 
type of politics (crisis). Rational actors should anticipate the balance of powers involved 
and reach the same outcome that crisis would bring about without incurring costs ω. 
And yet we know from the historical record that DGs do enter acrimonious crises, and 
that they do appeal to outside forces. To account for the emergence of crises, I refer to 
the informational asymmetry about the resources of the opposition, and in particular 
about the precise level of external alliance-building costs ρ. Because it is the only one 
who participates in the advisory committees, internationals forums, and informal 
meetings, DG COMP has private information about the exact value of ρ. When N over-
estimate that value while L over-estimate the collective action problems of N, crises 
may occur.      
 
The choice of the type of politics, and by implication of the type of policy, can be 
thought of as resulting from the following game, with the moves and payoffs as 
  19summarized in Figure 3. Nature determines the exact number of DGs belonging to N 
and L respectively as well as their respective policy stocks ΠN and ΠL. Then, the liberals  
 
 
FIGURE 3 : Choice of antitrust politics type, with DG COMP moving first. 
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  20choose whether to seek an external ally or to comply with the decisions of the pivotal 
DG of the Com. After the liberals make their choice, the non-liberals respond. 
 
If the liberals do not form an outside alliance, European antitrust politics remains 
largely an intra-Com affair, cases are decided by voting at the college of commissioners, 
and power rests with the pivotal DG in the Com. Since the pivotal voter belongs to the 
non-liberal camp, and provided politics remains uni-dimensional (the horizontal axis in 
Figure 2), it will expropriate part of DG COMP’s policy stock (i.e. resources and/or 
authority). For example, DG COMP may spend resources investigating a joint venture 
and end up proposing a prohibition, but the pivotal DG may ask for an exemption or at 
least a conditional exemption. Hence, the liberals end up with a diminished policy 
stock, and the anti-liberals with an increased policy stock (y’L and y’N  respectively). 
 
If, on the other hand, the liberals choose to form an outside alliance, the non-liberals 
may either choose escalation (i.e. do the same) or détente (not do the same). In the latter 
case, a strong antitrust policy prevails, which does not reflect the preference of the 
majority of DGs in the Com. The liberals solidify the status quo, but pay a price in 
terms of (a) concessions to their external ally, and (b) diminished Com unity. The non-
liberals retain their policy stock.  
 
Finally, if the non-liberals seek an external ally and allow for a crisis, they may 
eventually gain from it. Where that is the case, they expropriate as much of the liberals’ 
policy stock as their alliance wishes. Conversely, if their struggle fails, it is the liberals 
that expropriate as much of the non-liberals’ policy stock as they want. Crucially, 
however, the non-liberals are uncertain about the cost and solidity of the liberals´ 
alliance (note the information set in Figure 3). Accordingly, they estimate that cost is 
high with probability q, and low with probability 1 – q .      
 
This reasoning leads to certain Nash equilibrium strategies: the members of L must 
decide what set of actions to choose, given their expectations about N’s reaction to such 
actions. So, L look forward to the consequences of their choices in terms of N’s 
reaction, which in turn defines the final payoffs, and reason backwards to what the best 
choice is for them (i.e. for L). The comparative statics results indicate that the choice of 
antitrust politics depends on the dispersion of DG preferences (i.e. the distance between 
  21the ideal points of L, N, and P), the ability of DG COMP to delegate powers to NCAs, 
the cost of forging an external alliance, and the availability of information:  
 
Equilibrium 1: Tightly-scattered preferences or readily available NCAs. To decide what 
strategy to follow, the members of L compare their payoffs after forging an alliance 
with an external power with their payoffs after the pivotal DG, P, has expropriated them 
by transferring authority and/or resources from ΠL to N. For sufficiently small distances 
between the ideal points of L, N, and P, or otherwise where DG COMP can readily 
transfer antitrust powers to NCAs, the level of non-liberal attacks on antitrust (ΔΠ) will 
be low enough to make acceptance of P’s preference cheaper than the forging of an 
external alliance (unless the costs of the latter can only be expressed in terms of Com 
unity, i.e. unless the ideal points of DG COMP, the other members of L, and the 
national governments are all identical). Under these conditions, the dominant strategy 
for L is to let the commissioners vote on antitrust decisions. Intra-Com politics prevails, 
and European antitrust policy is decided by the pivotal DG in the Com, denoted by P. (I 
will come back to a final point about this equilibrium below.) 
 
Equilibrium 2: Medium-scattered DG preferences and medium-level costs of delegation 
to NCAs. Again, the  members of L must decide what strategy to follow by comparing 
their payoffs after forging an external alliance with their payoffs after the pivotal DG, P, 
has expropriated them by some amount. But here, the greater distance between L and P, 
and the greater cost of delegating powers to NCAs, means that ΔΠ and σ increase, and 
hence that ρ becomes relatively more attractive. Hence, the likelihood of antitrust policy 
being decided by the mere preferences of the pivotal DG in the Com declines, and 
depends on the level of ρ. Where the latter is relatively low, L will forge a solid external 
alliance. N will not do the same because, given the solidity of that alliance (i.e. the fact 
that ρ is comparatively low, even compared to medium levels of ΔΠ and delegation 
costs), that would only result in an erosion of Π. Antitrust policy will therefore progress, 
though probably only in an incremental fashion and with a bias in favour of the national 
governments that back it up.  
 
Equilibrium 3: Widely-scattered DG preferences and unavailability of NCAs. Faced 
with the same problem as before, the members of L must now begin to seriously worry 
about non-liberal attacks on antitrust. Not only do the members of N have radically 
  22different preferences, but they also know that no antitrust case can be easily delegated to 
NCAs; they only need to wait for a proposal to come out of DG COMP for a vote and 
they then reject it (or engage in an outright attack). Unless it accepts to cease 
production, L must seek an external ally. The crucial question, therefore, concerns the 
way N will react to that alliance. Will they acquiesce or will they try to form their own 
external alliance? The answer lies in their payoffs, which depend on the level of q (i.e. 
the probability they attach to the existence of high alliance costs for L). If q is low, the 
expected gain of forging a second external alliance is smaller than the value of 
accepting antitrust progress, and vice versa. Hence, for a whole range of values of q and 
σ, N will accept that L forge an external alliance without reacting by building their own 
external counter-alliance. Policy will look as it does under Equilibrium 2. On the other 
hand, as (a) preferences become very widely-scattered, (b) delegation to NCAs becomes 
unfeasible, and (c) N think they can create an anti-alliance more powerful than that of L, 
crisis erupts. Antitrust, just like all other EU policies, will suffer.  
 
Finally, it is worth returning to Equilibrium 1 to examine the options of DG COMP 
when it must rely on the good faith of the pivotal commissioner. As noted above, the 
latter may have very little of antitrust matters, be it in terms of the policy’s historical 
trajectory, of the requirements of legal consistency, or of the economic consequences of 
different options. That is the very essence of multi-task collegiality, and that is what 
makes European antitrust so different from, say, its U.S. counterpart. For, in putting 
forward its proposal (e.g. for a decision or for a Block Exemption Regulation), DG 
COMP must either accept a very high probability of being outvoted and therefore 
expropriated, or create a second political dimension, integration (the vertical axis in 
Figure 2). Unlike other instances of heresthetics (Riker 1986), this bi-
dimensionalisation of European antitrust politics is easy to both think of and to achieve.    
 
Conclusions: A plausibility probe, and extensions 
 
If this theory is correct, the past obsession of DG COMP with the goal of market 
integration is due neither to any objective set out in the Treaty nor to any problem of 
acute legalism among DG COMP bureaucrats and/or leaders. Rather, it may be 
explainable by the very structure of the Commission as a multi-task and collegial 
  23organization, and (a) the configuration of preferences therein, and (b) the ability or not 
of DG COMP to delegate powers to NCAs.  
 
The utility of this model, however simple it may be, is that it goes beyond simple 
anecdote or, at best, rationalization of variegated historical facts. Rather, it puts 
structure to our theoretical thinking of the context of European antitrust, and, though the 
identification of specific variables, it leads to falsifiable hypotheses. More generally, it 
demonstrates, I think, the advantages of thinking about EU politics not just in terms of 
“empty” constitutional politics, but in terms of the politics of specific public policies.  
 
In terms of empirical validation, consider the following plausibility probe, in two parts. 
First, before national governments passed “Europeanized” national competition laws, 
DG COMP focused much more on the goal of market integration than on any other 
possible antitrust goal. The Europeanization of national policies started somewhere 
between the late 1970s (when Greece adopted the first Europeanized national antitrust 
law in view of its entrance in the EEC) and the mid 1980s (when the newly-elected 
Chirac government in France passed ordinance 86-1243 of December 1, 1986). Italy 
then passed its first ever antitrust statute in 1990, and various other countries followed 
suit. For example, Section 60 of the British Competition Act 1998 obliged the national 
authorities to interpret national legislation according to European concepts and 
principles. With Germany, France, the UK, and Italy, plus many smaller countries, 
being able to deal with antitrust cases in a European way, DG COMP was able to 
“escape” the pivotal voter in the Commission, and hence to push for a more normal 
antitrust policy. That was indeed what happened right from 1997, with the publication 
of the Green Paper on vertical Restraints in EC Competition Policy
12, which 
inaugurated the era of “modernization” of European antitrust. The selection of vertical 
agreements as the first area to be modernized was not a coincidence: this area was 
where DG COMP had had to opt for the systematic prioritization of market integration 
(i.e. co-opt the pivotal DG in the Com) for over 30 years. 
 
Second, where DG COMP cannot rely on NCAs, where DGs have preferences that are 
too widely scattered, and where the non-liberals are uncertain about the strength of the 
                                                 
12 At http://europa.eu/documents/comm/green_papers/pdf/com96_721_en.pdf
 
  24alliance between the liberals and a powerful external ally, the whole system may fail. 
This was the case in at least two cases. First, in the 1950s, the High Authority was in 
charge of what the Commission took over after 1957, with the only difference that the 
former had more supranational powers than the latter. Yet, although the ECSC Treaty 
delegated vast antitrust (including merger control) powers to the High Authority, not a 
single antitrust decision was ever produced. On the contrary, protracted negotiators 
between the French members of the Authority (who wanted antitrust) and their German 
colleagues (who refused to hear about it) led to the involvement of all national 
governments and, eventually, to the collapse of the High Authority, the proposal for a 
new European Community, and the retirement of Jean Monnet (see Spierenburg, and 
Poidevin 1993). Second, the adoption of the European Community Merger Regulation 
in 1989 was initially considered a huge success. When it came to publish the first 
decision blocking a merger, however, the Com fell apart: the liberals tried to recruit 
national allies, the non-liberals were uncertain about the strength of that alliance and so 
engaged in building one for themselves, too, and the final outcome was an absurdly 
motivated decision that cast a huge shadow on the Com’s credibility as a merger 
regulator (Pollack 2003: 281-99).      
 
In terms of extensions, my impression is that this model is far from being specific to an 
idiosyncratic reading of EU politics or to a few historical cases. On the one hand, the 
formal structure of the model is much more general, as it is expressly inspired from 
macro-political economic models of redistribution and democratization (Boix 2003). On 
the other hand, the plausibility probes offered above form merely a random sample of 
cases that I could think of without engaging in empirical work.  
 
Finally, it is precisely by engaging in empirical work that we might learn about this way 
of conceptualising European Union politics, Commission politics, and antitrust politics. 
Of course, a lot will depend on the interpretation we make of specific events. If the 
application of the model is directed towards large-N studies, where the model predicts 
“typical” behaviour under the assumed circumstances, the issue of interpretation will 
arise in terms of measurement error. This can be remedied by directing the application 
towards small-n comparative studies, i.e. towards “token” behaviour (for example, of 
the Walt Wilhelm saga on the allocation of authority between the Com and NCAs).    
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